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Complex systems
1 Introduction
The interests of vendors and customers seem antagonis-
tic a priori, the former aiming at decreasing quality and
increasing price, whereas the latter wishing exactly the
opposite. The situation is fortunately more complex, the
interests of both sides being sometimes compatible. Intu-
itively, a vendor may sell more items by increasing their
perceivable quality, making everybody happier. But the
situation is more subtle because of asymmetric informa-
tion: the vendor knows much better than his prospective
customers the real quality of his products. In Akerlof’s
famous Lemon Problem, the customers have no means to
assertain the quality of products, which leads to a no-trade
paradox [1]. When the customers are better equipped,
optimal quality emerges [2–4]. One of the main issues
is to understand under which conditions a manufacturer
should diversify his production. Economics literature has
approached this problem mainly with the help of util-
ity functions. Several aspects have been studied, among
them optimal quality-based product diﬀerentiation [5],
ﬁrm competition by quality [6] and by price [7], the rela-
tion between product quality and market size [8], etc. (see
[9,10] for a review).
We assume that customers’ decisions, while inﬂuenced
by perceived properties of the products, are probabilistic
in nature. Using a probabilistic consumer choice frame-
work makes it possible to avoid utility functions and hence
our model can be understood as an alternative to the usual
a e-mail: matus.medo@unifr.ch
utility-function approach. For other alternatives, known as
models of discrete or probabilistic choice, which still use
utility theory and yet they are probabilistic see [11–13]. In
our work we take the point of view of a monopolistic ven-
dor faced to consumers deciding to buy one of his products
according to their perception of its quality. The resulting
complex complex system with one vendor, several product
variants, and many heterogeneous buyers, is investigated
by numerical techniques.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we in-
troduce our framework and determine the optimal quality
of a single product proposed to homogeneous or hetero-
geneous customers. In Section 3 we examine the condi-
tions under which a vendor should segment the market
by manufacturing several products of diﬀerent quality. In
Section 4 we allow the vendor to optimize the price as well.
We leave to the appendices a deeper discussion of our as-
sumptions and more technical results on the economics of
spamming.
2 Single product
We assume that the only diﬀerence between products lies
in their quality Q ≥ 0 which is therefore the main quantity
of interest here.1 With a suitable choice of units, one can
write the proﬁt of a vendor per item sold as 1−F (Q) where
F is an increasing function and F (1) = 1. For the sake of
1 One can also build a model starting from the tastes of the
buyers as in [14].
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Fig. 1. The acceptance probability PA(Q,α) for various values
of the acceptance parameter α.
simplicity, we take F (Q) = Q; F (Q) ∝ Q2 is also found in
the literature but does not alter qualitatively our results.
While Q could in principle be greater than one, a vendor
would never choose it, hence our analysis is restricted to
Q ∈ [0, 1].
We assume that a customer buys a product of qual-
ity Q with acceptance probability PA(Q). While there
are many possible choices, e.g. those of references [9,15]
or piece-wise linear functions as in reference [4], we shall
mainly use
PA(Q,α) =
(
1− 1α+1
)
Qα (α ≥ 0) (1)
where α > 0 is the acceptance parameter: for small α, PA
is mostly ﬂat, resulting in a lack of quality discrimination;
as α grows, the core of PA shifts towards higher qual-
ity, which reﬂects enhanced discrimination abilities (see
Fig. 1). We will use the shorthands “ignorant” for buyers
with a small α and “informed” for those with a large α;
an ignorant buyer is quite likely to reject even a perfect
product. Since for α > 0 and Q ∈ [0; 1] is PA(Q,α) < 1,
by equation (1) we implicitly assume that for the consid-
ered product there are substitutes which can satisfy needs
of consumers.
If there are N buyers with acceptance parameters αi
(i = 1, . . . , N), faced with a single product of quality Q,
the vendor’s expected proﬁt X is
X(Q) = (1−Q)
N∑
i=1
PA(Q,αi)− Z (2)
where Z represents the ﬁxed part of production costs due,
for instance, to the initial investment needed to setup the
manufacturing plant. Assuming that N is large, the ﬂuc-
tuations of X can be neglected. The structure of this ex-
pression is similar to the proﬁt function introduced in [9].
Since X ′(0) > 0, X ′(1) < 0, and X(Q) is a continuous
function, there is at least one Q maximizing X in (0, 1).
In the following we take the point of view of the vendor
and hence optimize his expected proﬁt X .
2.1 Homogeneous population
When there is only one type of buyers, the expected proﬁt
simpliﬁes to X(Q) = N(1−Q)PA(Q,α)−Z which reaches
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Fig. 2. Optimal vendor’s proﬁt per buyer x∗ as a function of
α for z = 0.05.
its maximum at
Q∗(α) =
α
α + 1
· (3)
Expectedly, Q∗(α) increases when the buyers have a shar-
per eye. The total optimal proﬁt reads
X∗(α) = N
αα+1
(α + 1)α+2
− Z. (4)
In Figure 2 we report the expected optimal proﬁt per
customer x∗(α): = X∗(α)/N as a function of α for z: =
Z/N = 0.05. When z > 0, a vendor only makes a proﬁt
when the quality is not too high or too low. Accordingly
x∗(α) has a maximum at α0 ≈ 0.65. Therefore, if the ven-
dor cannot easily change Q, he should target a population
with Q∗, or strive to modify the abilities of his prospective
customers to detect quality, thereby increasing his proﬁt.
When 0 ≤ α < α0), both the consumers and the vendor
beneﬁt from an increase in Q; we shall call it the coop-
erative region. Reversely, when α > α0 the vendor suﬀers
from excessive quality detection abilities of his customers;
he could try a confusing marketing campain or rebranding
so as to lower their abilities – this is the defensive region.
A similar behaviour has been observed in [16]. In our case,
the fact that the cooperative region is much smaller than
the defensive region is a consequence of the shape of PA.
For instance, when the prefactor in PA(Q) changes from
1−(α+1)−1 to 1−(α+1)−1/3, the size of the cooperative
region increases signiﬁcantly.
2.2 Heterogeneous buyers
Heterogeneity brings in more surprises. Let us split the
population into two groups, group i = 1, 2 consisting of
Ni buyers with acceptance parameter αi; the proportion of
group i is denoted by ci: = Ni/N . The vendor’s expected
proﬁt reads
X(Q) = N(1−Q)[c1PA(Q,α1) + c2PA(Q,α2)]− Z. (5)
It is not possible to maximize X analytically. The result of
numerical investigations is shown in Figure 3 as a function
of c2 for α1 = 0.1 (ignorant buyers) and various choices of
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Fig. 3. Optimal product quality Q∗ (left) and vendor’s optimal
proﬁt x∗ (right) versus proportion c2 for various values of α2;
α1 = 0.1, z = 0.01.
α2. As expected, as the proportion of informed buyers in-
creases, Q∗ grows. But a surprising behaviour is found for
instance when α2 = 3 : at c2 ≈ 0.32 the optimal quality
changes discontinuously. This is because X(Q) has two lo-
cal maxima. While for small c2 the small-Q peak yields the
largest proﬁt, its relative height decreases as c2 increases;
accordingly the discontinuous transition occurs when the
heights of the two maxima are equal. In Figure 3 we also
show the dependence of the optimal proﬁt per buyer x∗
on c2. When group 2 has α2 < α0 (e.g., α2 = 0.5), adding
people with more demands regarding quality is beneﬁcial
to the vendor (Eq. (4)) and X is an increasing function
of c2. By contrast, when α2 > α0 the optimal proﬁt ﬁrst
decreases as almost nobody of group 2 will buy anything
and does so as long as group 2 has less inﬂuence on Q∗
than group 1. Then group 2 supercedes group 1 and im-
poses its quality demands; the discussion generalises to an
arbitrary number of groups. In other words, when society
is too heterogeneous, it is impossible to satisfy all buyer
groups with one product.
3 Multiple products
Now we assume that the vendor displays M product vari-
ants of diﬀerent quality, at equal prices for the sake of
simplicity, and that each buyer buys at most one item.
A purchase is a two-step process, as a shopper has also
to decide on a variant. The choice is also assumed to be
probabilistic: variant m = 1, . . . ,M is chosen according to
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Fig. 4. Optimal proﬁt per buyer x∗ as a function of quality
Q: one product, two groups of buyers (α1 = 0.1, α2 = 3.0). As
c2 increases, at c2 ≈ 0.32 the heights of the maxima are equal
and a discontinuous change of the optimal quality occurs.
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Fig. 5. The probability to select variant 1 as a function of its
quality Q1 for various values of the selection parameter σ. In
total three variants are displayed, the qualities Q2 = 0.5 and
Q3 = 0.2 are ﬁxed.
PS(m|Q, σ) = Q
σ
m∑M
m′=1 Q
σ
m′
· (6)
Here σ ∈ [0,∞) quantiﬁes the selection ability of a given
buyer. When σ is large, the buyer almost surely selects
the best variant; on the contrary when σ = 0, PS(m) =
1/M for all m, i.e., the buyer has no discerning power.
Since PS is normalized, each buyer purchases at most one
item. Similar expressions appear in works on the inﬂuence
of advertisement [15] and non-price competition [9], but
other choices of functions would also be reasonable, such
as exponentials as in the Logit model [13,17]. All Qσm′ have
equal weight in equation (6); Section 3.3 generalizes this
expression in order to take into account the proportions
of displayed items. Finally, a more complete discussion on
the plausibility of PS is given in Appendix A.
To summarize, the variant m with the quality
Qm is bought by buyer i with probability PS
(m|σi,Q)PA(Qm, αi). As a consequence, if the vendor dis-
plays M variants to N buyers, his expected proﬁt is
X(Q)=
M∑
m=1
(1−Qm)
( N∑
i=1
PS(m|Q, σi)PA(Qm, αi)
)
−MZ.
(7)
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Fig. 6. (a) Optimal proﬁts per buyer as a function of propor-
tion c2; two-variant proﬁts x
∗
2 (broken and dashdot lines) are
shown only when quality diﬀerentiation occurs. (b) Optimal
quality as a function of proportion c2, curves for the diﬀerenti-
ated qualities Q∗1 and Q
∗
2 are only shown when x
∗
2 > x
∗
1. Values
of parameters are α1 = 0.2, α2 = 3.0, σ1 = 0.5, and σ2 = 3.0.
This equation can be easily extended to account for spe-
cial circumstances. For example, when Z is large, it may
be proﬁtable to produce one variant and achieve quality
diﬀerentiation by artiﬁcially damaging a fraction of the
production, e.g. by disabling some features [18]. In this
case two variants with qualities Q1 > Q2 are displayed
but the proﬁt per item sold is only 1 − Q1 for both of
them and the initial cost is reduced from 2Z to Z.
3.1 Quality diﬀerentiation
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on two groups of cus-
tomers consisting of Ni members with acceptance param-
eter αi and selection power σi (i = 1, 2). The question is
whether the vendor should display one or two products.
In our framework, the answer is entirely determined by
the respective optimal proﬁt of each possibility, denoted
by X∗1 (Q) and X∗2 (Q1, Q2).
Since manufacturing two products requires twice as
much initial investment (by hypothesis), the region in
which X∗2 > X∗1 shrinks when z increases. This appears
clearly in Figure 6 where we plot the optimal proﬁts ver-
sus c2 = N2/N for two values of z. In addition, when
X∗2 > X
∗
1 , the two optimal qualities Q
∗
1 and Q
∗
2 diﬀer
signiﬁcantly. Quite clearly, the lower quality targets the
group of ignorant buyers while the higher quality is for
informed buyers. Remarkably, when c2 > 0.68, the lower
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two variants
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Fig. 7. Phase space (c2, z) of optimal production: only 0, 1, 2
variants are allowed (a) and without constraints on the maxi-
mal number of variants (b). Same parameters as in Figure 6.
optimal quality is even smaller than the optimal quality
α1/(α1 + 1) = 1/6 corresponding to a homogeneous pop-
ulation of ignorant customers. This downward distortion
in a situation of a monopolistic vendor is also reported
in [19]; it is optimal as it reduces the substitution possi-
bilities of higher-value (or numerous enough) customers.
The beneﬁts of low quality variants in market competition
are discussed in detail in [6].
3.2 How many variants?
The phase space (c2, z) of optimal production when at
most two variants are allowed is reported in Figure 7a. At
intermediate values of c2, product diﬀerentiation exists if
z is small enough (see also [14]). Can a further decrease
of z diﬀerentiate further the production?
Figure 7b reveals the Russian-dolls structure of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation. Let us consider the case M = 3: when
X∗3 > X
∗
2 , in fact only two products are really diﬀerent,
i.e. Q∗1 = Q∗2 < Q∗3. In other words, it pays to duplicate
the low quality variant. This is because it decreases the
likelihood that an ignorant buyer selects the high quality
variant, while informed buyers, thanks to their high selec-
tion parameter, are still able to pick the premium variant.
This mechanism is at work for a generic M : when z is
small, for the vendor it may be optimal to display M − 1
low-quality variants with identical qualities and one pre-
mium variant.
Finally we consider the vendor’s expected proﬁt for
various numbers of displayed variants. As can be seen in
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Fig. 8. Optimal proﬁt for M displayed variants when z =
0.002 (a) and when z = 0 (b). Same parameters as in Figure 6.
Figure 8a, when z = 0.002, the additional gain decreases
very fast when M increases and vanishes when M > 4. By
contrast, when z = 0, X∗ saturates at the much higher
M = 40 and then decreases.
3.3 Biased selection
In equation (6) we implicitly assume equal standing of
the available variants, which is often not the case in
practice. This suggests to introduce variant weights rm
(
∑M
m=1 rm = 1) in the selection probability PS , taking
into account for instance the eﬀective visibility of each
product due to advertisement or display position in shops.
equation (6) generalizes to
P ′S(m|Q, r, σ) =
rmQ
σ
m∑M
m′=1 rm′Q
σ
m′
· (8)
An example of the interplay between rm and σ is shown
in Figure 9: better equipped customers are able to pick
the better product even when its eﬀective proportion is
small.
To study the eﬀects of the proposed generalization we
use once again two groups of customers and choose the
parameters so as to set the system in the quality diﬀer-
entiation region. Results of numerical optimization of the
optimal proﬁt are reported in Figure 10, r2 denotes the
proportion of the premium variant. Diﬀerentiation occurs
in a limited range of r2: when r2 is either too small or
too large, buyers eﬀectively notice only one variant and it
is preferable for the vendor to produce only that one. In
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
r2
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0.8
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PS′(2)
σ = 0
σ = 3
σ = 7
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(b) (c)
Fig. 9. (a) The probability to select variant 2 in the presence
of two variants with similar qualities (Q1 = 0.5, Q2 = 0.7)
for various σ. (b) When qualities are diﬀerentiated, informed
buyers are able to select the premium variant (dark symbols)
even when its proportion is small; ignorant buyers select mostly
the low quality variant (white symbols). (c) When only one
quality is displayed, the vendor has to compromise between the
two groups and a mediocre variant is optimal (grey symbols).
addition, x∗ has a maximum at r2 ≈ 0.08, which comes
from hiding the high quality variant to ignorant buyers
while keeping it accessible to informed buyers.
4 Price
Let us now consider the price as a free parameter and in-
vestigate how the vendor should ﬁx it optimally. Denoting
the price by p, the proﬁt per item is p − Q which means
that the maximum quality is Qmax = p. In particular, if
the vendor wishes to produce a better product that Qmax,
the price needs to be increased. The acceptance probabil-
ity generalizes to (α ≥ 0, p ∈ [Q,α + 1])
PA(Q, p, α) =
(
1− p
α + 1
)(
Q
p
)α
. (9)
It satisﬁes two constraints: ﬁrst, the higher the price, the
smaller the acceptance probability. Second, because of the
p/(α+1) term, the sensitivity towards prices decreases as
sensitivity to quality increases; similarly, quality must be
judged with respect to price, hence the (Q/p)α term. The
discussion of the previous sections corresponds to p = 1.
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Fig. 10. Optimal qualities (a) and the optimal proﬁt (b) versus
proportion of the premium variant r2 (α1 = 0.2, α2 = 3, σ1 =
0.2, σ2 = 2, z = 0.01, c2 = 0.5, M = 2).
We restrict our analysis to the simplest case of N iden-
tical buyers and one product. The expected proﬁt reads
X1(Q, p) = N(p−Q)
(
1− p
α + 1
)(
Q
p
)α
with p ≤ α + 1 and Q ∈ [0, p], it is maximized by
Q∗ =
α
2
, p∗ =
α + 1
2
. (10)
Expectedly, the more informed the buyers, the better the
products should be, but the vendor can charge a higher
price. Because p∗ − Q∗ = 1/2 is a constant, there is no
incentive in this model for exceptionally high prices for
high quality variants. In Figure 11, the resulting optimal
proﬁt per buyer x∗ is shown together with the optimal
proﬁt when the vendor has ﬁxed the price at 1. The liberty
to set the price can increase the proﬁt of the vendor quite
considerably. The diﬀerence of proﬁt for α > 1 (informed
buyers) is due to the fact that the vendor is allowed to
charge a higher price for the high quality demanded by
the buyers. By contrast, for α < 1 the main improvement
comes from the fact that PA(Q, p, α) does not vanish when
Q → 0 and p < 1.
5 Conclusion
Due to the complexity of markets and human behaviour,
attempts to propose a theory of the whole are illusory.
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Fig. 11. Optimal proﬁt x∗ vs acceptance parameter α: ﬁxed
price (solid line, the same curve as in Fig. 2) and variable price
(dashed line), z = 0.
However, simple models can bring insight to elementary
mechanisms at work in the real economy. Assuming prob-
abilistic buyer behaviour, we formalized buyers’ abilities,
spanning from the zero information to the perfect infor-
mation limits. Adopting the vendor’s point of view, we ex-
amined the compromise between low quality which mini-
mizes production costs and high quality which maximizes
sales. In particular, the fact that customers are hetero-
geneous forces vendors to diversify their production. In
other words, the large variety of products in free-market
economies reﬂects in part the information gathering and
processing abilities of customers.
In this work we focused on the basic market phenom-
ena but the proposed model is versatile enough to repre-
sent more complicated cases. Three important extensions
seem particularly worth further investigation: including
explicitly the price in heterogeneous populations, gener-
alizing the present results to an arbitrary number of con-
sumer groups, and adding more vendors and letting them
to compete for customers (then it can be Nash stable that
variants with diﬀerent qualities are provided by diﬀerent
vendors).
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Sichuan Province in China (Grant No. 2008HH0014), the stay
of Linyuan Lu¨ in Fribourg was supported by SBF (Switzerland)
through project C05.0148 (Physics of Risk). We acknowledge
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Appendix A: Discussion of the model
plausibility
In order to better understand the need for both selection
and acceptance procedures, it is worthwhile to consider
some alternatives. One possibility to simplify our assump-
tions is to keep only the acceptance process with each
displayed variant accepted or not according to the accep-
tance probability PA. When M variants with the qualities
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Q1, . . . , QM are displayed, the probability P ′ that a given
customer accepts at least one of them is
P ′(Q1, . . . , QM ) = 1−
M∏
a=1
[
1− PA(Qa)
]
. (11)
As M increases, P ′ converges to one. This means that
the vendor can attract the buyers by displaying a large
number of very bad products which is generally not the
case. However, ﬂooding of customers by low quality oc-
curs under some special circumstances. This economics of
spamming is brieﬂy discussed in the next Appendix.
Another approach is to reduce the model to the best
product selection governed by the selection probability PS .
Since this probability is normalized to one, when it is ap-
plied alone, each buyer surely buys one of the displayed
variants and consequently the vendor’s proﬁt maximiza-
tion yields zero quality. Obviously, such an optimal so-
lution is pathological. One could eventually consider re-
placing the unity in the equation
∑M
m=1 PS(m|Q, σ) = 1
by an increasing function of the displayed qualities but
this is eﬀectively equivalent to our two step decision pro-
cess. Another possibility is to introduce an artiﬁcial non-
purchase alternative to equation (6) with an imposed util-
ity as in [13] which focuses on price diﬀerentiation. We see
that nor the selection from the available variants is suﬃ-
cient to model the purchase process.
Finally, the generalization to diverse proportions of
displayed variants, introduced in Section 3.3, gives an ad-
ditional argument. We see that while in the selection step
both quality and proportion play their roles, in the ﬁnal
acceptance step it is only quality of the selected variant
what matters. Thus these two steps are intrinsically dif-
ferent and attempts to merge them are artiﬁcial.
Appendix B: Economics of spamming
By the economics of spamming we understand the situa-
tion when a low initial cost Z allows the vendor to pro-
duce an abundance of low quality variants. We simplify
our considerations to M variants with identical qualities
Q and identical buyers with acceptance parameter α. As-
suming that the variants are displayed consecutively, the
selection probability plays no role. This situation resem-
bles spam messages arriving into our mailboxes which we
reject one by one. According to equation (11), on average
N(1− [1−PA(Q,α)]M ) buyers accept one of the displayed
variants and the expected vendor proﬁt per buyer is there-
fore
x(Q,M) = (1−Q)
(
1− [1− PA(Q,α)]M
)
−Mz. (12)
Since we focus on low quality variants, PA(Q,α) is small
and the approximation 1 − x ≈ exp[−x] can be used. It
follows that for a given quality Q, the optimal number of
displayed variants is
M∗(Q) =
α + 1
αQα
ln
α(1−Q)Qα
z(α + 1)
· (13)
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Fig. 12. Optimal quality (a) and optimal vendor proﬁt per
buyer (b) versus acceptance parameter α.
However, when buyers’ perception is limited to a cer-
tain number of variants Mm, this value applies instead
of M∗(Q). Assuming small initial cost z, the leading con-
tribution to the optimal quality can be shown to verify
b ln[αQα/b] = Qα+1, where b: = z(1 + 1/α)). When the
resulting Q∗ 	 1, it follows that equation (13) take the
simple form M∗(Q∗) = Q∗/(αz); the optimal quality Q∗
has to be found numerically. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 12: as z gets lower, the optimal quality decreases and
the optimal proﬁt increases; in addition, when acceptance
parameters are small (10−2  α  1) the optimal proﬁt
per buyer is almost one which means that nearly all buyers
react to the spamming.
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